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Abstract. Imaging SSDs is problematic due to TRIM commands and
garbage collectors that make the SSD behave inconsistently over time.
It is this inconsistency that can cause a difference between images taken
of the SSD. These differences result in unmatched hash number gener-
ation and would normally be attributed to contamination or spoliation
of digital evidence. DaP is a proposed method that ensures all images
taken of the SSD are consistent and removes the volatility normally as-
sociated with these devices. DaP is not focused with the recoverability of
deleted data, however DaP does stabilise the device to prevent uninten-
tional contamination due to garbage collection. Experiments show that
the DaP method works on a range of devices and consistently produces
the hash-identical images. The conclusions are to consider DaP as a new
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) when imaging SSDs.
1 Introduction
A principle throughout all stages of any forensic investigation is the preserva-
tion of evidence. Digital Forensics is not exempt from this principle and has been
identified at an embryonic stage in McKemmish [6], in digital forensic guidelines
[1,14,11] and digital forensic frameworks [2,4]. Beebe & Clarke [2] state that dig-
ital evidence preservation is a fundamental principle and should be considered in
all phases of a digital forensic investigation and continue to suggest that spolia-
tion of digital evidence should be kept minimal and extensive contemporaneous
notes are to be taken in such cases. These are cases where in order to extract
the evidence it is necessary for the competent investigator to alter that evidence,
this is not the case with SSDs. It has been demonstrated in [5] that with the
investigator following SOPs and imaging the SSD, the digital evidence on the
SSD changes. These changes are due to garbage collection and are independent
of write-blockers, meaning that an SSD can change over time. Such “covert”
changes yield inconsistencies between third party images. It is becoming com-
mon knowledge among practitioners that the practicality of producing two or
more exact byte-for-byte images (hash-identical) from SSDs for all parties is be-
coming problematic [3]. Generally, the probability of producing hash-identical
images is diminished as the time between seizure and data acquisition stage is in-
creased. Nisbet et al [8] showed that for some TRIM enabled file systems deleted
data is unrecoverable after 1 hour. This includes time between different data ac-
quisitions and is due to the volatility of SSDs, TRIM enabled file systems and the
variance of aggressiveness of the manufacturer’s garbage-collector. Furthermore
there has been an increase in manufacturing of SSDs [13] that indicate SSDs
will become ever more present in Digital Forensic Investigations. The problem
is that there is a preconceived idea that these are storage media and therefore
treated as traditional HDD. This treatment of digital evidence could jeopardise
the evidential integrity and therefore raise questions about its admissibility in
court. In addition TRIM enabled file systems can wipe clean SSDs in less than a
minute. This is ideal for a quick sanitisation and permanent removal of all data
without the prospect of recovery. The unrecoverability is attractive to criminals,
who would rather loose their data then have it seized, examined and analysed
for prosecution or as a result of e-Discovery requests.
McKemmish [6] states, “meaning of the data accessed by such change has
not been unduly compromised”. As long as the change can be accounted for,
completed with competence and contemporaneous notes taken results in the
potential digital evidence not being unduly compromised then change to digital
evidence can be allowed in a court of law. In Carrier & Spafford’s DFF [4] digital
Crime Scene Preservation and Documentation sub-phase it states, “.... preserve
the state of as many digital objects as possible by reducing the number of addi-
tional events that may occur...”. The proposed DaP procedure does exactly this
by prohibiting the activation of the garbage collector and the non-execution of
TRIM commands on the SSD.
The need for a systematic way of producing hash-identical images for SSDs
would be advantageous to all parties and may include: reduction in time spent
on questioning the evidential integrity of digital evidence obtained from SSDs;
and reduce administrative and cognitive burden on Digital Forensic Analyst to
ensure that minimal steps taken to reduce the risk of contaminating the data
on SSDs. The proposed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), Deconstruct and
Preserve (DaP), is explained in §3, experiments on DaP are described in §3,
results of experiments are described in §4 and finally conclusions are in §5.
2 Background
2.1 Solid State Drives, SSD.
SSDs cannot over-write like HDDs. This, along with wear-levelling [3], means
that the equivalent of sectors have to be reset to zeroes, before being written to.
This creates all kinds of problems that is the responsibility of the controller. One
of the most notorious challenges to computer forensics is the garbage collector.
To increase the efficiency of the reset/write process on SSDs the garbage collector
will identify deleted files, and their associated blocks and reset them. This means
that if the garbage collector is scheduled then any deleted data on the SSD will be
lost. A write-blocker will not prevent the loss of data since the garbage collector
is located in the controller.
To help this process further file systems have developed TRIM. When TRIM
is enabled it allows the Controller to identify deleted/unallocated space on the
SSD and start the reset process. TRIM has a scheduled time and initiates the
garbage collector. Why is this an issue for Digital Forensics? There are two
reasons: i) data loss; and ii) evidential integrity.
Data Loss. Wipe commands are more effective on SSDs. This allows devices
to be wiped quicker, essentially this is the responsibility of the garbage collector
and manufacturers have established aggressive ways of resetting gates to zero.
Whereas to wipe a HDD may take two takes and many hours, SSDs can do this
in one take and minutes. It will not be long before suspects can initiate a wipe
of the SSD remotely. Once the SSD has been wiped then recovery of data is
impossible; this data-loss is a threat to digital forensics and would change the
SOP of seizure and collection of digital evidence.
Evidential Integrity. Evidence integrity forms the basis of certainty that ev-
idence under investigation has not been changed upon seizure or when volun-
teered. All best practice guidelines [1] stipulate that evidence in the first instance
should not be changed, or when change is necessary this process must be docu-
mented and be repeatable by third parties using the same steps.
Typically a digital forensic investigation of a device can be described in [6]
and by the following notation in Fig.1. This shows the Acquisition stage and
importantly the verification that the images, Ii,∀i > 0, are byte for byte copies
of the device, I0. The verification of evidential integrity is described in the ac-
quisition stage by ensuring that the hashes match. When hashes do not match
during an acquisition stage the evidential integrity has been compromised.
Seizure: S(I0)
Management: M(I0)
Acquisition: D(I0) = I1
– D(I0) = Ii
where D(I0) is the duplication process
– Hk(I0) = Hk(Ii) ∀i,
where
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n;
Hk is a hashing algorithm, e.g. SHA1 then HSHA1; and
n is the number of images of the device, I0, required.
Analysis: A(I1)
Report: R(I1)
Fig. 1. Nomenclature to describe five stages of Digital Investigation as indicated in [6].
This notation indicates the device as I0 and any resulting image of that device as In,
where n > 0. For example, the Acquisition stage yields I1 and subsequent stages use
I1, an image, and not I0, the original device.
Whilst other technology that is susceptible to change (such as GPS, mobile,
network seeking technology) can be managed by investigators by using methods
to physically secure those types of devices to prevent access, change to data and
deliberate deletion, SSDs have no such measure.
SOP on mobile devices have adopted to best perfect techniques that can re-
cover data from volatile devices, non-standard operating systems, hybrid devices,
encrypted and locked devices. Peer acceptance from investigators together with
pseudo-standardised processes offered by forensic vendors have led to a commu-
nity practice where in mobile phone investigations it is an accepted practice that
at times agents [7] may need to be installed on Android devices to extract data
from devices and removed post extraction.
The proposed DaP SOP wants to create a peer accepted methodology for
SSD technology regardless of manufacturer differences. This development would
provide assurance to practicing investigators that evidence has not been altered
and provides confidence that steps are repeatable by third parties. By ensur-
ing evidential integrity suspects and defence teams cannot argue that crucial
evidence has been lost that would aide in their defence.
3 Method
The set of experiments show how evidence can be deliberately deconstructed in
order to preserve evidence. The experiment demonstrates how this would work on
traditional devices without loss or effect to content. This paper then continues
the experiment on SSD and provides a procedure for preserving evidence via
deconstruction.Table 1 outlines the stages in DaP, this is further described in
the list below and would be encapsulated in standard operating procedures for
seizure, transportation, storage, analysis, reporting and presentation of digital
evidence.
1. Pre-verification : non-essential, but strongly recommended and required
to prove preservation of potential digital evidence and no contamination has
occurred. Also benefits Digital Forensic Investigators to confirm and verify
the data acquisition stages, see stages 5-6. Using a hashing algorithm, hash
the SSD to yield HI0 .
2. Deconstruction : Completed by competent practitioner trained in DaP.
Deconstructs the SSD/partition and identifies the component responsible
for management, e.g. MBR or VBR. Once identified the start and end of the
offset address of the component are recorded, it is then extracted from I0
and stored as I1 in a secure location by the custodians.
3. Preservation : Completed by competent practitioner trained in DaP. Pre-
serving the SSD partition requires inserting, ⊕, the component identified in
the deconstruction stage with zeroes, Zy−x. The size of Z is determined by
y − x and the start location is at offset x. This stage preserves the SSD by
putting it in a stable state and therefore prevent any risk of contamination.
It is recommended to Hash the device that can be matched in stage 4 and
thus ensure that the acquisition stage is completed correctly.
Table 1. Stages for Deconstruct and Preserve, DaP. Explanation of stages as follows:
1. H - hashing function e.g. SHA256, to uniquely identify device; 2. Eyx - deconstructs
and extracts VBR between offset x, y; 3. Zy−x - zeroes of length y−x; ⊕yx - inserts the
first operand, Zy−x, into the second operand, I0. 4. D(I0) - data acquisition producing
an exact byte-for-byte copy, Ij . 5. ⊕ inserts the output from deconstruction into the
image, Ij between offset x, y. 6. H - complete hashing on reconstructed image, the
result equals the original device for all images.
4. Acquisition : Using write-blockers and NIST approved software duplicate
the original device, I0. This stage can be repeated many times to yield Ij ,
where j ≥ 2.
5. Reconstruction : Request I0 from the custodians along with the start and
end offset addresses, x, y. Insert, ⊕, the original component, I0, into the
image of the preserved SSD, Ij , to yield a new image that can be read and
analysed.
6. Verification : Non-essential but strongly recommended. Using a hashing
algorithm, hash the image, Hk(Ij), and test for match with HI0 .
All stages are fully automated using code as described in experiment. DaP
is formally described as in Fig. 2.
4 Results & Evaluation
4.1 Control Experiment.
The following list explains the process of the experiment, that is not too different
from [3]. The minor differences are: i) Python code, instead of batch code; ii) the
replacement of ’EVIDENCE’ with ’12345678’; and iii) the size of the files. The
Pre−Verification : Hk(I0) → HI0
Deconstruction : Eyx(I0) → I1
Preservation : Zy−x ⊕yx I0 → I0
Acquisition : D(I0) → Ij , j ≥ 2
Reconstruction : I1 ⊕yx Ij → Ij , j ≥ 2
Verification : Hk(Ij) = HI0 , ∀j ≥ 2
Fig. 2. Description of DaP as a generalised formal process. The operation Q ⊕yx P
indicates insert Q in P between the offset address x, y
major difference is the Deconstruct and Preserve stage that backs up data
from the VBR (FAT file system was used here), thus rendering the file system
useless and disabling the ability of any file system dependent information being
altered. Then by reconstruction of the device as an image so that software can
be used to analyse and produce reports.
The control experiment was completed on a USB using FAT16. The size of
the USB was small at ≈256Mbytes. This experiment demonstrates an imple-
mentation of DaP and its principles, albeit on a small scale. The experiment
was repeated 5 times and results shown in Table 2. The hashing algorithm used
was SHA with 512Byte option, reducing hash collision [10] to an insignificant
probability. These set of results had 100% matches and therefore the practical
supports the theory with non-volatile media. In the next sub-section the aim is
to apply this to SSDs.
Test Device SHA512 Repatriation SHA512 Recovery Percent
1 match match 100
2 match match 100
3 match match 100
4 match match 100
5 match match 100
Table 2. Control experiment and yields identical SHA512 hashes for Device and Repa-
triation. Results were conducted on a ≈256MByte USB, a non-volatile data storage
medium.
4.2 SSD Without DaP
Section 4.1 shows that DaP works on traditional media. To see if DaP works
on SSDs (file system: EXT4, OS: Linux, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS) an experimental
framework was set up to test the hypothesis: does the introduction of DaP
preserve evidence? To test this two experiments are required: i) to prove without
DaP evidence is destroyed; and ii) to prove with DaP evidence is preserved. The
following steps were repeated 5 times on various partitions, all code written in
python and available on request from first author. The following steps outline
the experiment:
Format: Create a ≈ 15Gbyte TRIM enabled partition. External Partition con-
nected SATA to eSATA, since TRIM commands can be executed through
SATA [12].
Generation: Generate a template/file with string ’12345678’
Populate: Fill (98%) the partition with the file.
Deletion: Delete Files
Hash: Hash the partition, H1
TRIM: Issue TRIM command, fstrim -v /media/user/sdb1 . This is simi-
lar to pseudo-activation of cron, or likewise in other operating systems, to
instantiate and identify deleted files.
Hash: Hash the partition, H2
Test Device TRIM Enabled H1 = H2
1 SanDisk Yes False
2 OCA-Agility Yes False
3 Micron M510 Yes False
4 Kingston V Series No n/a
5 SK Hynix SC210 Yes False
Table 3. SSD without DaP. All hashes before and after TRIM do not match.
This experiment demonstrates without DaP the evidence on the SSD is
changed and thus the two images before and after differ.
4.3 SSD With DaP
The above results in section 4.2 show that after issuing the TRIM command the
evidence changes. In this section the experimental framework introduces DaP, all
other conditions remain, e.g. OS. The experiment is described in the list below:
Format: Create a ≈15Gbyte TRIM enabled partition. External Partition con-
nected SATA to eSATA, since TRIM commands can be executed through
SATA [12].
Generation: Generate a template/file with string ’12345678’
Populate: Fill (98%) the partition with the file.
Deletion: Delete Files
Hash: Hash the partition, H1
DaP: Complete stages 1-2 of DaP.
TRIM: Issue TRIM command, fstrim -v /media/user/sdb1
DaP: Complete stages 3-4 of DaP.
Hash: Hash the image partition, H2
Test Device TRIM Enabled H1 = H2
1 SanDisk Yes True
2 OCA-Agility Yes True
3 Micron M510 Yes True
4 Kingston V Series No True
5 SK Hynix SC210 Yes True
Table 4. SSD with DaP. All hashes before and after TRIM command match.
The results show that the partitions before and after TRIM are preserved
and therefore future images of this partition can match. The content can be
retrieved once the image is reconstructed. In all cases this produced a match
with the original content and thus preserves digital evidence (DaP also worked
on TRIM disabled SSD).
The hypothesis is accepted, DaP preserves digital evidence on: TRIM enabled
SSDs; TRIM disabled SSDs; and traditional non-volatile storage media.
5 Conclusion
DaP is a proposal to effectively resolve issues related to digital evidence preser-
vation on SSDs and ensures the stability and consistency of current and future
images taken from the SSD. To emphasise DaP is not going to increase the abil-
ity to recover data from SSD. Market share of SSD is increasing, along with
that is knowledge by defendants that there are methods to wipe the information
with 0% chance of no data recovery. Research [3,5,8] has backed this fact up and
shows under certain circumstances how this can be achieved. Under e-Discovery
requests, such violations are covered by the wilful destruction of evidence under
the guise of a preservation order [9], however a preservation order does not exist
at crime scenes. The defendant can exercise the deletion of data remotely, once
the TRIM and deletion command is issued the garbage collector destroys any
chance of recovering the data. This all happens whilst in the Digital Forensic
Lab. DaP is able to preserve the data on the SSD and keep the data consistent
between different images taken of the SSD. With the above experiments this has
been shown to be stable and valid; each experiment was duplicated a few times
to ensure the reproducibility and each time each image gave the same result,
identical hash number. DaP would work on HDD as well and add a further layer
of protection along with traditional hardware, such as write-blockers. With this
in mind the introduction could change several SOPs for first response teams.
Finally, there are some recommendations for the use of DaP.
5.1 Recommendations.
DaP has been presented as a SOP to handle the data acquisition stage of an
SSD. The recommendations are as follows:
– Follow SWDGE, NIJ or other national [11,14] guidelines for Digital Evidence
Sequestration for First Response Teams (FRT).
– complete the extraction stage as early as possible, and even consider this as
part of the FRT’s procedures.
– use a custodian database to store the extraction of H1. This is future work
and would involve chain of custody updates for other requests to image the
device.
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